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olfson's effort and that of his fellow lexicographers is hard,
long-lasting, and laudable. Roughly 50 percent of the
anthropologists listed as such in North America will welcome the work. Some 20 percent will not. (That includes this commentator.) The rest will be, as usual, undecided.
Wolfson's nomological science is what anthropologists call nomothetic; it concerns the abstract and the universal. The term is contrasted with idiographic, which concerns the concrete and the individual.
History is idiographic; some anthropologists are too, but the majority
look for rules and norm-which is the nomothetic approach.
Anthropologists have created another, related pair of contrastive
terms that I will need in this assessment: emic and etic. Emic describes
the use of the language and symbols of the society being investigated, in
ways that make sense to the members of that society but not necessarily
to outsiders such as anthropologists. Etic describes the use of a languag~,
methods, and manner of presentation in ways that make sense to fellow
social scientists but not necessarily to members of the society being
studied.
There was a time, say, just before the sixties, when most anthropologists, that is, people on anthropology payrolls and people applying
for grants, thought that they had to be scientists a Ia physicists and
mathematicians in order to be proper social scientists. In some anthropology pep talk we still hear, not as embarrassedly as before, about the
need for formalized systems, for whatever-metrics, for total objectivity,
which can be achieved only through formal, artificial languages.
I submit that such a need does not exist because anthropology (and to
a lesser degree sociology) does not have to emulate formal science at all.
The objectivity of anthropology is now in question-not only in the
sense of whether objectivity is possible but, even more, whether it is
desirable. If we want to understand people-mostly other people-and
their culture, our first concern should be to look for methods which
provide the most exhaustive information and not for parsimony and
elegance. As byproducts the latter are fine; but they are not, and should
not be, the main targets of the ethnologist's quest. (I write as an anthropologist, of course.)
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Anthropology, sociology, and economics are usually units in the arts
and sciences or liberal arts divisions of universities. Along with many
other anthropologists, I believe that the idiographic approach is just as
important as the nomothetic (nomological) approach-and usually far
more interesting and informative about the proper subject of anthropology, which is people. I also believe that this group of social sciences
is better affiliated with the arts part of the arts and science establishment.
The strife between substantivists (idiographers) and formalists
(nomologists) in economic anthropology is, of course, the strife
between Wolfson's antioomologists and oomologists. It is a healthy
conflict, but I don't think either side can or should win. There is a
hidden agenda here: Nomologists know that many antioomologists are
afraid of figures and formulas; idiographers know that oomologists
know that-regardless of whether they, the idiographers, are in fact
afraid of formulas. Many are not. Idiographers can and occasionally do
sit down for a couple of weeks crashing the wall of inhibitions, to learn
the really quite simple techniques and notations separating the images
held by the wider public of oomologists and idiographers. Among those
idiographers who are not scared of figures and formulas, and among
those who are, some fight the oomologists for ethical aodj or aesthetic
convictions-which is what I am doing here at this moment. I contend
that the promised lexicon says nothing about societies and cultures that
cannot be said idiographically and oomothetically, because not all
nomothetic propositions require formal languages to express them.
Many simple explanations and all complex sociocultural explanations,
be they nomothetic or idiographic, are better expressed in ordinary
language, since formal languages tend either to bypass exceptions or to
ignore them as unimportant. The entire Chomskyao creed rose and fell
over a period of less than three decades on that very count.

N

ow the anthropologist Marvin Harris, reporting on his wife's
making a hamburger, listed a chain of some twenty actions
(i.e. minimal eric action components), each of which is traceable on a videotape. Wolfson's P5 sneak preview features F-bel-(p),
which may be read as "Individuals which have F believe that p." But
how is he going to deal with the following field note of mine?
High-caste males in this village will avoid directly worshipping
low-caste goddesses unless the benefit thought to accrue supersedes purity-pollution considerations; or the low-caste goddess
has been sufficiently upcasted.
There are similar notes from about half a dozen anthropologists today
working along this general template. If my own note is written down in
one or more of Wolfson's primitives, it is bound to be longer io type
count than the statement in ordinary language. The ordinary-language
statement can be read idiographically by focusing on the clause "in this
village"; or oomologically by tabulating or schematiziog the "will
avoid" (i.e., tend to avoid) phrase in the statement.
To compound the misery, Wolfson quotes Feyerabeod of 1962, where
he averred that the meanings of the terms constituting the axioms of a
theory are totally dependent on that theory. But the mature Feyerabeod
rejected this erstwhile pedantry; the maio thrust of his magnum opus in
the same Minnesota series (Against Method) is the rejection of any
distinction between observation (experience?) and theory :
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1. P.K. Feyerabend, Af(ainst Method,
Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of
Science (Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota Press, 1970). p. 165.

Abolish the distinction between a context of discovery and a
context of justification, and disregard the related distinction
between observational terms and theoretical terms. Neither distinction plays a role in scientific practice. Attempts to enforce
them would have disastrous effects. 1
When Wolfson rebukes Peter Winch for claiming that understanding
social phenomena depends entirely on experiencing them, he is right by
the mature Feyerabend's count; and when Rudner charged that Winch
commits the "reproductive fallacy," Rudner was wrong-not because
Winch does not do so but because reproductive fallacy is, like the
psychiatric labels schizophrenia and paranoia, a term of persuasion and
insult; it does not describe any state of affairs.
A science of human behavior is not necessarily nomological. The
kind of science that analyzes human behavior may be idiographic or
nomothetic; it is part of the arts and science program of advanced
Western thinking traditions. Preference for the one does not abridge
the scientific legitimacy of the other. Anthropology and sociology, if
viewed as both humanities and social sciences, remain science regardless of their assignment to one or the other category, or to both. If
formalized languages are the criteria! instrument of science, then
history, classical philology, and all other branches of learning which
aggregate knowledge through and about the use of natural languages
would not be sciences; but this is egregious nonsense.
Wolfson says that only the proof of the impossibility of a scientific
(read formalized) treatment of social research would disenfranchise the
nomologist. But this is not so. The nonnomologist is not ipso facto an
antinomologist. By Feyerabend's motto "Everything goes," the idiographer leaves the nomologist be. Both share a wider domain-social
science; neither has to invade or legislate the other domain.

I
2. Steven Tyler, The Said and the
Unsaid: Mind, Meanin,; and Culture,
Language, Thought, and Culture (New
York: Academic Press, 1978), p. 140.
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f we grant that a scientific theory is a linguistic entity-which I do
-then there must be no implicit or explicit exclusion of theoretical
rypes, idiographic or nomological. Chomsky thought that linguistic
utterances are preprimed messages generated by a transmitter and
received by a receptor. His more dogmatic followers excluded consideration of the unpredictable, hence unformalizable, components of real
language. Steve Tyler neatly put it when he wrote that "the transformationalists give us either a spurious account of speech or at best an
account of spurious speech." 2 On the anthropological side, ethnosemanticists (e.g., Conklin, Frake, Goodenough) have constructed
elegant and exhaustive charts generating kinship terminologies,
exhausing the lexicosemantic extensions of kinship nomenclature.
These are, however, the excrescences of the nomothetic doctrinarian;
they have little to do with actual people and actual languages. Neither
postulates nor axioms nor the resultant theorems exhaust or even tap
the sociocultural universe.
Entitates non sint multiplicanda praeter necessitatem ("Do not
multiply entity beyond necessity") : Occam's razor enjoins us not to
introduce more items or arguments than are needed to explain something. It seems to me that Wolfson's effort violates this rule. If artificial
languages are made in terms of natural languages, as Wolfson suggests,
then the former must either be purely heuristic or redundant. In mathematical discourse, no natural-language interpretation need interrupt a
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chain of formal notations. But in the social sciences, including the
special case of organizational behavior, this is not the case. For a theory
of organizational behavior, which Wolfson's lexicon wants to aid, a
formal language-even the bare seven primitives-might be one
feasible aid. For the analysis of organizational behavior, however, this
entire apparatus may be an unneeded additional entity.
Suppose a nomologist using Wolfson's primitives and an idiographer
using natural language want to generate a theory for monastic behavior.
In an analysis of monastic organizations (not in a theory of such organizations), not one but several natural languages are involved (Latin,
Greek, Church Slavonic, Sanskrit, Tibetan, Chinese, etc.). Now terms
denoting packets of monastic organization prove to be virtually
untranslatable, say, between Tibetan and Russian Orthodox organizations. Although there is some institutional overlap, a terminological
or lexical leveling fails; it provides some very superficial, impressionistic brackets, but it ignores substantial differences, as I showed long
ago. 3
In studying such monastic institutions the idiographer has no
problem; he needs common sense and philological skills. What about a
theory of monastic behavior in cross-cultural perspective? A generalsystems approach doesn't work cross-culturally and never claimed to.
But I submit that a nomological approach, using "primitives" or other
tools, cannot do the job either: The notation would become too cumbersome and complex to cover the corpus that establishes a theory of
organizational behavior-a theory shared by institutions with a recognizably common theme across widely separate cultural lines.

3. New Encyclopedia Britannica, 4th
ed., s.v. "monasticism. "

I

f social scientists feel squeamish about their scientific status, their
attention should be drawn to Godel's theorem. With a slight
modification for the purpose of social science, it puts a damper on
the scientific fervor of nomologists. The theorem: A completely
formalized system does not provide axioms that are provable within
the system itself. Basic axioms postulated by any notation or formalization will remain either ambiguous or incomplete. In order to have an
interesting and important investigation of cultural behavior (of which
organizational behavior is one case), the results of that investigation
must be, at some point, counterintuitive; that is, unexpected results
must occur. If a formalized language could describe counterintuitive
processes, and if such a formalized presentation could be briefer and
more parsimonious than the relevant presentations in natural languages, then I would cede superiority to such an auxiliary language. The
seven primitives as I read them do not provide notations for the
counterintuitive, and I do not see how they could. They therefore seem
to limit the analysis of sociocultural events and sequences; they do not
allow for innovations and mutations which account for the counterintuitive.
Wolfson complains about the multiple or equivocal meanings of
terms used by social scientists resulting in "vast umbras and penumbras
of unclarity." Fair enough, but the remedy lies in improving the naturallanguage diction of the social scientists, not in abolishing it or relegating
it to some sort of secondary status. If a poet writes bad poetry, and if a
powerful critic convinces him and the audience that it is bad poetry, the
critic might recommend that the poet write better poetry but not that
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he switch to mathematics. At least in cul[ural anthropology as practiced
in North America, there is a keen awareness of terms being fuzzy and
the need to reach some consensus on only one meaning of each term.
This has been accomplished for many ineluctably woolly terms in use by
the fathers of this recent science and by their less wary progeny. Thus
primitive as the epithet of a society now means "small-scale, band-type
society with simple technology not exceeding hunting and gathering or
swidden agriculture." Each of the constituent terms is defined in natural
language in the anthropologists' dictionaries-by which I mean the
glossaries anthropologists append to their larger opera. Wolfson is of
course right when he suggests that all sorts of ideological investments
prevent or deflect the reduction of fuzzy terms to terms with single
meanings; but again, the remedy lies in overcoming these investments
and in creating sober terms with consensually defined meanings. When
March and Simon, as quoted by Wolfson, worried about defining "formal organizations" like United States Steel or the country grocery
store, their worry was incompletely informed: Only Euclidean mathematical and (theoretical) physical terms are definable; "formal organizations" are not. But they can be analyzed and described exhaustively;
and in the social sciences, an exhaustive description including the
exhibition of probable causal nexuses is all we can get by way of
definition.
I am worried about Wolfson's sanguinity: that the definitional
systems implied by or contained in the lexicon might be "a test-bed for
infant theories in the social sciences ... and aid in the further formalization and development of such theories ." Formalization and development are not coordinate terms. Formalization arrests development.
Like structuralism in French anthropology, it spells out, presents, or
otherwise encompasses a single frame, or at best a number of immediately linked consecutive frames, in an ongoing process analogous to
that in a filmstrip or videotape. Formalization quite literally arrests
development. For a formal grid to cover a process rather than a
stationary scene, it would have to change its formal terms at each
consecutive node, which would again complicate the spelling far beyond
any analysis in a natural language.

ocial theorist, so Wolfson suggests, would start from scratch
ike a theoretical physicist rather than "start out in terms of
humors or fluids, proclivities or tastes, as occurred in natural
science before Newton, and as is too often the case in the social
sciences now." No, sir, as is too seldom the case in the social sciences
now; because too many social scientists still insist on aping-badlythe physical and natural scientist, Godel and the mature Feyerabend
notwithstanding. If the social scientist starts from scratch, he starts
from nothing; in good scholastic language, ex nihilo fit nihil. The
physicist starts out from totally different scratch. His building blocks
are intellectual constructs to begin with, and many of the results he
achieves are, by his own effort and admission, further intellectual
constructs. We hope that the social scientist deals with people and
societies, not with intellectual constructs. But let there be intellectual
constructs for the social scientist: So long as they are ancillary to the real
job on hand-which is understanding society (an intellectual construct)
and societies (people), culture (an intellectual construct) and cultures
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(people and their seen and unseen works)-they are welcome and
essential heuristic devices in the social scientists' enterprise. But they
must not become ends in themselves, overtly or covertly. Intellectual
constructs hardly ever become ends in themselves overtly. They do not
target on the study of people but turn into a display of esoteric skills.
This state of the art also brings about trivialization, cognitive
redundancy, and ellipsis. Formalized statements tend to trivialize the
sociocultural object, since what makes the object complex is outside the
ken of a purely nomothetic thrust. There are, succinctly put, no laws for
exceptions; but sociocultural life consists very largely of exceptions to
rules either cherished or imagined or stipulated. There is cognitive
redundancy when the formalization represents a system which has
already been analyzed in a natural language; cognitive redundancy is the
modern name for Occam's razor. I have talked about ellipsis at the
beginning of this commentary: What obstructs an elegant formalization in the form of minor events, or side roads and bypasses, is a major
part of the ernie situation, which the etic statement cannot ignore
without peril; and a formal lexicon, of course, is the most completely
etic statement thinkable.
Though I am moderately opposed to Binswanger's Lebensphilosophie and the whole German philosophical anthropology (I regard it
as bad philosophy and as no anthropology), I do go along with
Binswanger's notion that all abstractions are transpositions and
simplifications of reality. I feel that Wolfson's strenuous scheme goads
toward a simplification of sociocultural facts-as do all formal
taxonomies. If cultural anthropology is a holistic science, anthropologists must rid themselves of their craving for the inapplicable
purity of the physical sciences and mathematics. The mathematicalphysical model is as bad for anthropology as the medical model is for
psychiatry. The ambiance of arts and sciences is wider than the wellinformed groping of the cultural anthropologist, idiographic or
nomothetic, as well as the scientist's abstraction and formalization. In
fact, the boundary of arts and sciences lies exactly around these two
provinces of possible thinking.
In fine, Godspeed to Wolfson's lexicon. I may even buy it, mainly in
order to ostensively show to my students that there are many ways to do
social science.

https://surface.syr.edu/suscholar/vol3/iss1/17

6

